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This paper studies a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium life-cycle model where parents and
their children are linked by bequests, both voluntary and accidental, and by the transmission of
earnings ability. This model is able to match very well the empirical observation that households with
similar lifetime incomes hold very diﬀerent amounts of wealth at retirement. Income heterogeneity
and borrowing constraints are essential in generating the variation in retirement wealth among low
lifetime income households, while the existence of intergenerational links is crucial in explaining the
heterogeneity in retirement wealth among high lifetime income households.
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Many papers document that households with similar characteristics, such as lifetime income,
age, and family structure, hold very di⁄erent amounts of wealth at retirement (see among
others Hurst, Luoh and Sta⁄ord (1998), Venti and Wise (2001), Hendricks (2004) and Grafova,
McGonagle and Sta⁄ord (2006)). Various economists (see for example Bernheim, Skinner and
Weinberg (2001) and Hendricks (2004)) argue that this feature of the data is inconsistent with
most models of life-cycle consumption-saving behavior, and thus constitutes a challenge to such
theories and their policy implications.
The literature so far has examined the implications of various models for the cross-sectional
distribution of wealth among people of all ages (see Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997) and Cagetti
and De Nardi (2004)). Some recent papers (Engen, Gale and Uccello (1999, 2004), Scholz,
Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2004), and Hendricks (2004)) have examined the implications of
di⁄erent models on wealth dispersions at retirement age. The standard life-cycle framework
used to study wealth dispersion typically assumes ex-ante identical households, ex-post income
shocks, and incomplete markets. In such models, households are ex-post heterogenous in the
realization of income shocks and wealth holdings. This version of the model implies a tight rela-
tionship between lifetime earnings and wealth. Income-rich people are wealth-rich at retirement
age, but wealth di⁄erences among households with similar earnings usually are small.
Hendricks (2004) builds a dynastic world where a worker has a constant probability of
moving between ￿age￿states, and is altruistic towards his/her descendants. He ￿nds that while
the qualitative implications of the model are in line with the data, the quantitative implications
are not. In the data there is a positive but low correlation between earnings and wealth, and
a large heterogeneity in retirement wealth among households with similar lifetime earnings.
The observed wealth di⁄erence at retirement between earnings-rich and earnings-poor is small
compared to the one predicted by Hendricks￿version of the life-cycle model.
Engen, Gale and Uccello (1999, 2004) study the adequacy of household retirement saving
and ￿nd that households at the median of the empirical wealth-lifetime earnings distribution are
saving as much as or more than what the underlying model suggests is optimal, and households
2at the high end of the wealth distribution are saving signi￿cantly more than the model indicates.
Scholz, Seshadri and Khitatrakun (2004) compare, household by household, wealth predictions
that arise from a life-cycle model to data in HRS and ￿nd that the model is capable of accounting
for more than 80 percent of the cross-sectional variation in wealth.
This paper explores the implications of a richer model of saving behavior, proposed by De
Nardi (2004). In this model, households face uninsurable labor income risk, uncertain lifetimes
and a borrowing constraint. Households save to self-insure against labor earning shocks and
life-span risk, for retirement, and possibly to leave bequests to their children. The key feature
of this model, compared with Engen, Gale and Uccello (1999, 2004), and Scholz, Seshadri and
Khitatrakun (2004), is that members of successive generations are linked by bequests and by
the children￿ s inheritance of part of their parent￿ s productivity. The key di⁄erences of this and
Hendricks￿model are that (i) households do not know the exact time and amount of inheritance,
and (ii) they are not allowed to borrow against future inheritance.
In this model households are also ex-ante identical. Retirement wealth inequality arises
because households di⁄er in the timing of earnings over the life cycle and in the amount and
timing of inheritance received. I ￿nd that while di⁄erences in the timing of income shocks
and borrowing constraints can generate large heterogeneity in retirement wealth for households
at lower lifetime income deciles, di⁄erences in the timing and amount of inheritance help to
generate large heterogeneity in retirement wealth for households at higher lifetime income
deciles.
The existence of a borrowing constraint prevents households from smoothing consumption
intertemporally. Two households may have the same lifetime earnings, but one may have
positive earning shocks when young and negative earning shocks when old while the other has
negative earning shocks when young and positive earning shocks when old. At retirement, these
households will hold amounts of wealth that di⁄er substantially.
Inheritance adds another source of wealth heterogeneity among households with similar
lifetime earnings. Some earnings-poor households hold a large amount of wealth at retirement
because they have inherited a large amount of assets. Some earnings-rich households receive
no inheritance and thus own less wealth.
3I also compare the benchmark economy with one without intergenerational links. This
comparison indicates that heterogeneity of inheritance does not play a big role for the lower
and middle income deciles, but does play an important role at generating wealth heterogeneity
for the higher income deciles. Modeling bequests as luxury goods is key to generate a skewed
distribution of inheritances and a large wealth heterogeneity among households with similar
high lifetime income.
This paper is also related to the literature that attempts to account for the skewness of
wealth distribution. Laitner (2001) uses an overlapping generations model with both life-cycle
saving and altruistic bequest to successfully match the high degree of wealth concentration.
Castaæeda et al. (2003) show that a model of earnings and wealth inequality, based on ex-ante
identical households facing uninsured idiosyncratic shocks to their endowments of e¢ ciency la-
bor units, accounts for the U.S. earnings and wealth inequality well. De Nardi (2004) constructs
a model in which parents and children are linked by accidental and voluntary bequests and by
earnings ability and shows it can explain the emergence of large estates and the long upper tail
of the wealth distribution. Cagetti and De Nardi (2003) use higher marginal returns to busi-
ness investment and the bequest motive to reproduce the high concentration of wealth at the
top of the distribution. This paper goes one step further and explains the wealth distribution
conditional on age and lifetime income.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I present some empirical results from Venti
and Wise (2001) and Hendricks (2004) documenting heterogeneity of retirement wealth among
households with similar lifetime earnings. In Section 3, I present the model and de￿ne the
equilibrium. The calibration of the model is presented in Section 4. In Section 5, I present the
quantitative results of the benchmark model. Section 6 investigates the quantitative importance
of income heterogeneity and inheritance heterogeneity. Brief concluding remarks are provided
in Section 7. Technical discussions about the computational algorithm are provided in the
Appendix.
42 Empirical Findings
When we claim that households are ￿similar￿with respect to their lifetime income, a fundamen-
tal question is whether we are using a good measure of lifetime income. Recent work by Venti
and Wise (2001) and Hendricks (2004) is particularly careful about measuring this important
variable.
Venti and Wise (2001) use data from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) for house-
holds whose head is between age 51 to 61 in 1992. They use wealth of the household and
lifetime income measured by historical earnings reported to Social Security Administration.
They ￿nd that at all levels of lifetime earnings there is a large dispersion in the accumulated
retirement wealth. They argue, informally, that the dispersion of retirement wealth must be
attributed to di⁄erences in the amount that households choose to save. They also ￿nd that
investment choices matter little in determining the dispersion of retirement wealth.
Hendricks (2004) uses data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) on lifetime
income and wealth, where the latter corresponds to the average wealth reported between the
age of 50 and 65, discounted to age 60.
Figure 2.1 shows the scattered plot of log retirement wealth and log lifetime earnings from
Hendricks (2004) and displays the correlation between retirement wealth and lifetime income.
At all levels of lifetime earnings there is large dispersion in the accumulated retirement wealth:
a signi￿cant fraction of high income households save very little and a signi￿cant fraction of low
income households save a lot.
Figure 2.2 displays the Gini coe¢ cient of retirement wealth for each lifetime income decile
from Venti and Wise (2001) and from Hendricks (2004). The PSID narrow income measure
consists of only wages and salaries received by the household head and the spouse. The broad
income covers most forms of income other than interest and dividends. We observe that con-
trolling for age and lifetime earnings, there is still large wealth inequality: the Gini coe¢ cients
are all above 0.4. The degree of wealth inequality declines with lifetime income decile.
Figure 2.3 displays the median retirement wealth normalized by mean lifetime income at
each income decile from Venti and Wise (2001) and from Hendricks (2004). This is meant to
5measure how large the wealth di⁄erences are between earnings-rich and earnings-poor house-
holds. We observe that the earnings-rich households save more relative to their lifetime earnings
than the earnings-poor households. The ratio of median wealth to lifetime earnings more than
doubles between the 2nd and the 9th earning deciles.
Table 2.1 shows some statistics summarizing the relationship between retirement wealth
and lifetime earnings computed by Hendricks (2004) from PSID. From the baseline sample we
notice that:
1. Retirement wealth is strongly correlated with lifetime earnings: The correlation coef-
￿cient between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth (C_WE) is 0:48, and the correlation
coe¢ cient between log lifetime earnings and log retirement wealth (C_LWE) is 0:51.
2. Controlling for age and lifetime earnings reduces wealth inequality. The average of the
Gini coe¢ cients across lifetime earning deciles is 0:60, compared with 0:70 to 0:75 in the full
sample, depending on the year.
3. Earnings-rich households hold more wealth relative to lifetime earnings: the ratio of
retirement wealth relative to lifetime earnings for the 9th versus the 2nd lifetime earnings
decile (R_90/20) is 1:78.
These papers￿￿ndings thus indicate that households with similar lifetime incomes hold
diverse amounts of wealth at retirement age, even when samples are restricted to exclude
sources of wealth heterogeneity that are not related to income. These features of the data
constitute a challenge to our theories of saving behavior.
3 The Model
The economy is a discrete-time overlapping generation world with an in￿nitely lived govern-
ment. There are idiosyncractic income shocks. There are no state contingent markets for the
household speci￿c shocks. The only ￿nancial instrument is a one-period bond. The members
of successive generations are linked by bequests and the children￿ s inheritance of part of their
parent￿ s productivity. At age 20 each agent enters the model and starts consuming, working,
and paying labor and capital income taxes. At age 30 the agent procreates. After retirement
6the agent no longer works but receives interest from accumulated assets and social security ben-
e￿ts from the government. The government taxes labor earnings, capital income and estates
and pays pensions to the retirees.
3.1 Demographics
During each model period, which is 5 years long, a continuum of people is born. Since there
are no inter-vivos transfers, all agents start their working life with no assets. I denote age t = 1
as 20 years old, age t = 2 as 25 years old, and so on. At the beginning of period 3, the agent￿ s
children are born, and four periods later (when the agent is 50 years old) the children are 20 and
start working. The agents are retired at t = 10 (when they are 65 years old) and die for sure by
the end of age T = 12 (before turning 80 years old). From t = 10 (when they are 65 years old),
each person faces a positive probability of dying given by (1 ￿ pt). The probability of dying is
exogenous and independent of other household characteristics. The population grows at rate
n. Since the demographic patterns are stable, agents at age t make up a constant fraction of
the population at any point in time. Figure 3.1 illustrates the demographics in the model.
3.2 Technology
There is one type of goods produced according to the aggregate production function F(K;L)
where K is the aggregate capital stock and L is the aggregate labor input. I assume a standard
Cobb-Douglas functional form and a single representative ￿rm. The ￿nal goods can be either
consumed or invested into physical capital. Let C denote the aggregate consumption, I the
aggregate investment on physical capital goods, G the government spending, and ￿ is the
depreciation rates on physical capital. The aggregate resource constraints are:
C + I + G = F(K;L) = AK￿L1￿￿ (1)
K0 = I + (1 ￿ ￿)K: (2)
Households rent capital and e¢ cient labor units to the representative ￿rm each period and
receive rental income at the interest rate r and wage income at the wage rate w.
73.3 Timing and Information
At the beginning of each period, households observe their idiosyncratic earning shocks and
possibly receive some inheritance from their parents. Then labor and capital are supplied to
￿rms and production takes place. Next, the households receive factor payments and make their
consumption and asset allocation decisions. Finally uncertainty about early death is revealed.
The idiosyncratic labor productivity status and assets holding are private information and
the survival status is public information. I assume that children can observe their parent￿ s
productivity when their parent is 50 and the children are 20.
3.4 Consumer￿ s Maximization Problem
3.4.1 Preferences
Individuals derive utility from consumption and from bequest transferred to their children upon
death. Preferences are assumed to be time separable, with a constant discount factor ￿. The






Following De Nardi (2004), the utility from bequest is denoted by
￿(b) = ￿1(1 + b=￿2)1￿￿: (4)
The term ￿1 re￿ ects the parent￿ s concern about leaving bequests to her children, while ￿2
measures the extent to which bequests are luxury goods.
Note that this form of ￿ impure￿bequest motive implies that an individual cares about the
bequests left to his/her children, but not about consumption of his/her children.
3.4.2 Labor Productivity
In this economy all agents of the same age face the same exogenous age-e¢ ciency pro￿le ￿t,
which recovers the fact that productive ability changes over the life cycle. Workers also face
8stochastic shocks to their productivity level. The Markov process of worker￿ s stochastic pro-
ductivity, Qy; is given by:
lnyt = ￿y lnyt￿1 + ￿t; ￿t s N(0;￿2
y).
This Markov process is the same for all households. This implies that there is no aggregate
uncertainty over the aggregate labor endowment although there is uncertainty at the individual
level. The total productivity of a worker of age t is given by the product of the worker￿ s
stochastic productivity in that period and the worker￿ s deterministic e¢ ciency index at the
same age: yt￿t.
The parent￿ s productivity shock at age 50 is transmitted to children at age 20 according to
the following transition function Qyh:
lnyt = ￿yh lnyh;t+6 + ￿t; ￿t s N(0;￿2
yh).
What the children inherit is only their ￿rst draw; from age 20 on, their productivity yt evolves
stochastically according to Qy.
For simplicity, I assume that children cannot observe directly their parent￿ s assets, but only
their parent￿ s productivity when they are 20 and their parent is 50. Children infer the size of
the bequests they are likely to receive based on this information.
3.4.3 The Household￿ s Recursive Problem
In the stationary equilibrium, the household￿ s state variables are given by (t;a;y;yp): The ￿rst
three variables denote the agent￿ s age, ￿nancial assets carried from the previous period, and the
agent￿ s productivity, respectively. The last term yp denotes the value of the agent￿ s parent￿ s
productivity at age 50 until the agent inherits and zero thereafter. When yp is positive, it is
used to compute the probability distribution on bequests that the household expects from the
parent. When the agents have already inherited, yp is set to be 0.
According to the demographic transitions, there are four cases.
9(i) From t = 1 to t = 3 (from 20 to 30 years of age), the agent survives for sure until next
period and does not expect to receive a bequest because his/her parent is younger than 65.
Since the law of motion of yp is dictated by the death probability of the parent, for these sub
periods yp0 = yp.
V (t;a;y;yp) = max
c;a0 U(c) + ￿E(V (t + 1;a0;y0;yp)) (5)
subject to
c + a0 = (1 ￿ ￿l)w"y + (1 + r(1 ￿ ￿a))a (6)
a0 ￿ 0; c ￿ 0: (7)
At any subperiod, the agent￿ s resource are derived from asset holdings, a, labor endowment,
"y. Asset holdings pay a risk-free rate r and labor receives a real wage w. The evolution of y
is described by the transition function Qy: Government taxes labor income at the rate ￿l and
interest income at the rate ￿a:
(ii) From t = 4 to t = 6 (from 35 to 45 years of age), the worker survives for sure until the
next period. However, the agent￿ s parent is at least 65 years old and faces a positive probability
of dying at any period; hence, a bequest might be received at the beginning of the next period.
The conditional distribution of bequest a person of state x expects in case of parental death
is denoted by ￿b(x;:). In equilibrium this distribution must be consistent with the parent￿ s
behavior. Since the evolution of the state variable yp is dictated by the death process of the
parent, yp0 jumps to zero with probability 1 ￿ pt+6. Let Iyp>0 be the indicator function for
yp > 0; it is one if yp > 0 and zero otherwise.
V (t;a;y;yp) = max
c;a+ U(c) + ￿E(V (t + 1;a0;y0;yp0)) (8)
subject to
c + a+ = (1 ￿ ￿l)w"y + (1 + r(1 ￿ ￿a))a (9)
a0 = a+ + b0Iyp>0Iyp0=0; (10)
10and (7), where a+ denotes the ￿nancial assets at the end of the period before receiving bequest.
(iii) The sub periods t = 7 to t = 9 (from 50 to 60 years of age) is the periods before retire-
ment, during which no more inheritances are expected because the agent￿ s parent is already
dead by that time. Therefore yp is not in the state space any more. The agent does not face
any survival uncertainty.
V (t;a;y) = max
c;a0 U(c) + ￿E(V (t + 1;a0;y0)) (11)
subject to (6) and (7).
(iv) From t = 10 to t = 12 (from 65 to 75 years of age), the agent does not work and does
not inherit any more, but faces a positive probability of dying. In case of death, the agent
derives utility from bequeathing his/her assets.
V (t;a) = max
c;a0 U(c) + ￿pt(V (t + 1;a0)) + (1 ￿ pt)￿(b) (12)
subject to (7) and
c + a0 = (1 + r(1 ￿ ￿a))a + p
b = a0 ￿ ￿b ￿ max(a0 ￿ exb;0):
Households receive pension p: For simplicity, I assume the pension level is independent of
household￿ s income history. Government taxes bequests at the rate ￿b for the proportion above
the exemption level exb:
3.4.4 De￿nition of Stationary Equilibrium
I focus on an equilibrium concept where factor prices are constant over time. In addition,
the age-wealth distribution is stationary over time. Agents di⁄er in term of their age, assets
holding t, and idiosyncratic labor productivity y and also parent￿ s labor productivity yp at age
50. Each agent￿ s state is denoted by x: An equilibrium is described as follows.
De￿nition 1 A stationary equilibrium is given by government tax rates and transfers (￿l;￿a;￿b;exb;p);
11an interest rate r and a wage rate w; value functions V (x); allocations c(x), a0(x); a family of
probability distributions for bequests ￿b(x;:) for a person with state x; and a constant distribu-
tion of people over the state variables x: m￿(x), such that the following conditions hold:
(i) Given government tax rates and transfers, the interest rate, the wage, and the expected
bequest distribution, the functions V (x); c(x) and a0(x) solve the above described maximization
problem for a household with state variables x.
(ii) m￿ is the invariant distribution of households over the state variables for this economy1.








C + (1 + n)K ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)K + g = F(K;L)
(iv) In equilibrium the price of each factor is equal to its marginal product:
r = F1(K;L) ￿ ￿; w = F2(K;L):
(v) ￿b(x;:) is consistent with the bequests that are actually left by the parents.
(vi) Government budget constraint is balanced at each period.
4 Calibration
The model has nineteen parameters. I pick ￿fteen of them from other empirical studies and
choose the remaining four parameters so that the model matches the bequest-output ratio, the
capital-output ratio, and the ratio of average bequest left by people in the lowest 95th bequest
percentile to GDP per capita, and government budget is balanced2.
I set the rate of population growth, n, to the average value of population growth from 1950
to 1997 from Economic Report of the President (1998). The pt￿ s are the vectors of conditional
1I normalize m
￿ so that m
￿(X) = 1, which implies that m
￿(￿) is the fraction of people alive that are in a
state ￿.
2Since one period in this model corresponds to 5 years in real life, I adjust parameters accordingly.
12survival probabilities for people older than 65 and is set to the mortality probabilities of people
born in 1965 provided by Bell, Wade, and Goss (1992).
The deterministic age-pro￿le of labor productivity ￿t is taken from Hansen (1993). Since
I impose mandatory retirement at the age of 65, I take ￿t = 0 for t > 9. The logarithm of
the productivity process is assumed to be an AR(1) process with persistence ￿y and variance
￿2
y. These two parameters ￿y, and ￿2
y are estimated from PSID data and aggregated over ￿ve
years (Altonji and Villanueva (2002)). The logarithm of the productivity inheritance process
is also assumed to be an AR(1) process with persistence ￿yh and variance ￿2
yh. I take ￿yh from
Zimmerman (1992), and take ￿2
yh to match a Gini coe¢ cient of 0.44 for after-tax earnings.
I take ￿; the share of income that goes to capital, to be 0.36 (Prescott (1986), Cooley
and Prescott (1995)). I take depreciation to be 6% (Stokey and Rebelo (1995)). Given the
calibration for the production function, the before-tax interest rate on capital net of depreciation
r, is 6%.
The capital income tax ￿a is set to be 20% (Kotliko⁄, Smetters and Walliser (1999)). The
rate ￿b is the tax rate on estates that exceed the exemption level exb. I choose these parameters
from De Nardi (2004) who matches the observed ratio of estate tax revenues to GDP, and the
proportion of estates that pay estate taxes, 1.5%. The social security replacement rate p
is chosen to be 40%, a number commonly used in the social security literature. G is total
government expenditure and gross investment, excluding transfers and is chosen to be 18% of
GDP (Council of Economic Advisors (1998) for 1996). The labor income tax ￿l is chosen to
balance government budget.
I take risk aversion coe¢ cient, ￿, to 1.5, from Attanasio et al. (1999) and Gourinchas and
Parker (2002), who estimate it from consumption data. This value is in the commonly used
range (1-5) in the literature.
I choose the discount factor, ￿; to match the capital-output ratio of 3. I use ￿1 to match
bequest output ratio of 2.65% in the US simulation (Gale and Scholz(1994)). ￿2 is chosen to
match the ratio of average bequest left by single decedents at the lowest 95th percentile over
GDP per capita (Hurd and Smith (1999)).
135 Numerical Results
This section examines to what extent the quantitative life-cycle model, with income hetero-
geneity, inheritances heterogeneity and borrowing constraints, can account for the relationship
between retirement wealth and lifetime earnings and the observed large wealth di⁄erence among
households with similar lifetime earnings. To answer this question, I ￿rst solve for the equilib-
rium, and I then simulate 600,000 households starting from age 20. Each household￿ s actual
inheritance is drawn from the bequest distributions calculated in the equilibrium.
5.1 Benchmark
5.1.1 Distribution of Lifetime Earnings
The distribution of lifetime earnings, in the data and in the model, normalized by average
lifetime earnings is plotted in Figure 5.1. This data comes from table 2 in Venti and Wise (2001).
Lifetime earnings measured by the present value of social security earnings are surprisingly
evenly distributed. The extreme low lifetime income for the lower two deciles is caused by
the fact that some persons in these deciles were employed in sectors not covered by the Social
Security system and thus reported zero social security earnings. The model does a good job
in matching lifetime earnings for each decile. Since this is not one of the features matched by
construction, it can be seen as evidence of the ability of the model to replicate the realistic
distribution of lifetime earnings.
5.1.2 Wealth Distribution
Table 5.1 reports values for the wealth distribution for the benchmark economy. I present shares
for the quintiles, the 80-95%, the 95-99%, the top 1%, and the Gini coe¢ cient for wealth. The
U.S. data on the wealth distribution is from De Nardi (2004) who uses the 1989 Survey of
Consumer Finances (SCF) and refers to households 25 years of age and older. Wealth includes
owner-occupied housing, other real estate, cash, ￿nancial securities, unincorporated business
equity, insurance and pension cash surrender value, and is net of mortgages and other debt.
In the data wealth is highly unevenly distributed with a Gini coe¢ cient of 0.78. The top
141% of the households hold 29% of the total wealth and the 95-99% of the households hold 24%
of the total wealth. The model generates a skewed wealth distribution that is comparable with
the data except for the top 1% of the wealth. The fraction of wealth held by the richest 1% is
21% in the model, compared with 29% in the data. There are more persons with non-positive
wealth in the model than in the data. This may be caused by the lack of inter-vivos transfer
in the model.
5.1.3 Bequest Distribution
Table 5.2 reports values for the inheritance distribution implied by the benchmark economy
and for the data from the SCF (Hendricks (2004)). All inheritances received by either spouse
are de￿ ated and discounted to the year where the head is 50 years old both in the model and
in the data. In the data inheritances are highly unevenly distributed: 70% of the households
receive very little or no inheritance during their life time. The top 2% of the households receive
69% of all the inheritances and the top 5% of the households receive 81% of all the inheritances.
This table shows that the model generates a skewed inheritance distribution that is comparable
with the data. 70% of the households aged 50 receive no inheritance during their life time. The
top 2% of the households receive 70% of the total inheritance and the top 5% of the households
receive 83% of the total inheritance.
Modeling bequests as luxury goods is essential to match the observed skewness in the
inheritance distribution. The intuition is that, the marginal utility from bequeathing is positive
at 0 so wealth-poor households may not leave any bequest at the last stage of their life cycle.
Some large inheritances are transmitted across generations because of the voluntary bequests.
The richest households have strong bequest motives to save and keep some assets to leave to
their children even when very old. Their o⁄spring are more likely to be earnings-rich and thus
tend to leave more wealth to their o⁄spring, thus generating skewed inheritance distribution.
Figure 5.2 compares the cumulative distribution of estates at any given time both in the
model and in the actual data. The U.S. data on the estate distribution comes from Hurd and
Smith (1999) who use the Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) data
15exit interview of 771 deceased between 1993-19953. The distribution of the bequest is very
concentrated both in the data and in the model: 30% of the deceased AHEAD respondents
had an estate of no value4. The mean estate was $104,500 but the median was much lower
($62,200). Some respondents leave relatively large estates: 30% are in excess of $120,000 and
5% are $300,000 or more. Only 3% of the estates were valued in excess of $600,000. The estate
distribution generated by the model actually matches very well with the AHEAD data.
To compare the size of the inheritances with lifetime income, I present in Table 5.3, the
ratio (in percentage) of lifetime inheritances to lifetime household earnings, both discounted
to age 50. For the majority of households in the PSID, inheritances account for only a small
fraction of lifetime resources. In the benchmark economy, for 95% percent of the households,
inheritances account for less than 4.7% of lifetime resources, compared with 3% in the PSID.
If we looked at the 98th percentile, the number goes up to 7.5%, while in the data it is 10.7%.
The model does a very good job of matching this feature as well.
5.1.4 Wealth Inequality and Lifetime Earnings
I de￿ne retirement wealth to be wealth at age 65, the year before retirement, and lifetime
earnings to be earnings from age 20 to 60, discounted to age 20 using an after-tax interest rate
of 4.8% as in the model.
Figure 5.3 shows the scattered plot of log retirement wealth and log lifetime earnings gen-
erated by the model, where I normalize values using 1992 dollars. The model implies a positive
correlation of retirement wealth with lifetime income and a large dispersion in accumulated
retirement wealth at all levels of lifetime earnings. In the benchmark model as in the data, a
substantial fraction of high income households save very little and a signi￿cant fraction of low
income households save a lot.
Figure 5.4 compares the Gini coe¢ cients for wealth for each decile in the benchmark econ-
omy and in the actual data. We notice two important features. First, we observe that control-
3I use distribution for single decedents instead of the one for all decedents (which turns out to be 1-2 times
bigger) because typically a surviving spouse inherits a large share of the estate, which will be partly consumed
before ￿nally being left to the couple￿ s children.
430% households report leaving no bequest in AHEAD but 70% households report reveiving no inheritance
in SCF and PSID. One reason is that estates are often divided among several children.
16ling for age and lifetime earnings, there is still large wealth inequality in the model: the Gini
coe¢ cients in all income deciles in the benchmark economy are all above 0.35. Second, the
degree of wealth inequality declines as lifetime income increases, as is observed in the data. For
example, in the model the Gini coe¢ cient is 0.64 for the 2nd income decile and is 0.40 for the
5th decile. The model economy matches the wealth inequality for the lower and higher deciles
quite well but underestimates wealth inequality for the middle deciles a bit.
Figure 5.5 shows the ratio of median retirement wealth to mean lifetime earnings for each
lifetime income decile. In the model as in the data, earnings-rich households hold more wealth
relative to lifetime earnings. The model does a very good job in matching median retirement
wealth to lifetime earnings ratios observed in the data at the various deciles.
To better gauge the amount of wealth disperse at retirement generated by the model, Fig-
ures 5.6 a-c compare the retirement wealth distributions for the 2nd, 5th and 9th lifetime
earning deciles in the model with those in the data, where wealth is normalized by household
earnings. The model successfully replicates the fact that households with similar lifetime in-
comes hold diverse amounts of wealth. A large fraction of households in the 2nd income decile
hold almost no wealth by the time they have attained age 51-61. The model also replicates the
fact that households in the lower wealth deciles hold very little wealth while households in the
higher wealth deciles hold much more wealth5. The model generates skewed wealth distribution
comparable to the data for the 2nd and 5th lifetime earning deciles. Among households in the
9th lifetime earning decile in the model, most people but the richest hold more wealth than in
the data.
Table 5.4 compares some statistics summarizing the relationship between retirement wealth
and lifetime earnings in PSID with those in the benchmark economy6. We ￿nd that in the
benchmark economy the correlation between retirement wealth and lifetime earnings (0.41) is
positive and of the same magnitude as in the data (0.48)7. Controlling for age and lifetime
5In particular, the ratio of median retirement wealth to average household earnings is close to the data. From
Figure 5.5 we see that the ratio of median retirement wealth to mean lifetime earnings for the 2nd lifetime income
decile is much lower that in the data. These two seemly contradicting ￿ndings could be explained by the fact
that the mean lifetime earnings for the 2nd lifetime income decile in the model is higher than in the data.
6The results are the same if I throw out the richest top 0.3% of the households, which shows up in ￿gures 5.3
and 5.7 as the horizontal top ￿stripes￿ .
7The correlation coe¢ cient between log lifetime earnings and log retirement wealth among households with
17earnings reduces wealth inequality: the average Gini coe¢ cient of retirement wealth within
lifetime earning deciles is 0.46, compared with 0.60 in the data. In the model, earnings-rich
households hold more wealth relative to lifetime earning (7.4 times) than in the data (3 times).
On the one hand, this is caused by the fact the model underpredicts the median retirement
wealth for the ￿rst two decile and overpredicts the median retirement wealth for the 9th decile
due to the equalizing social security system. On the other hand, as we noticed in Figure 5.1,
the model overpredicts lifetime earning for the ￿rst two deciles. This explains, in part, why
R_90/20 is much higher in the model. If I adjust for the di⁄erence of lifetime earnings at the
2nd and the 9th deciles between the model and the data, then R_90/20 drops to about 4.9 in
the model.
Compared with the joy-of-giving model in Hendricks (2004), the benchmark economy gen-
erates much larger heterogeneity in retirement wealth holding among households with similar
lifetime earnings. The are two important reasons for the di⁄erence in ￿ndings. First, in Hen-
dricks (2004), households know the exact time and amount of inheritance and are allowed to
borrow against future inheritances when young, which relaxes the borrowing constraints for
young agents. As a consequence, a large part of inherited wealth is consumed before retire-
ment. Second, since bequests are not modeled as a luxury good, inheritance distribution is
not as skewed as in the data and households at the bottom 70% receive 38% of the total in-
heritance, which is counterfactual. In this model, households cannot borrow against expected
bequests, which generates more heterogeneity in retirement wealth among households with
similar lifetime earnings.
5.2 Households Without Inheritance
While the benchmark model does a good job in generating heterogeneity in retirement wealth
among household with similar lifetime earnings, let us now try to understand the key features
of the model by comparing 50-year-old households that did and did not inherited for each
positive wealth (C_LWE) is 0:79; much higher than the one in the data (0.51). However, this discrepency is
mainly caused by the non-linear function of logarithm. The correlation coe¢ cient between lifetime earnings and
retirement wealth among the sample of households with positive wealth is 0.39, which is slightly lower than the
that among all households since most households with zero retirement wealth are income-poor.
18income decile. This comparison can shed light on what role inheritance plays in generating the
heterogeneity of retirement wealth.
5.2.1 Wealth Inequality and Lifetime Earnings
Figures 5.7 and 5.8 compare the relationship between retirement wealth and lifetime earnings
in the model among all households and among households who never inherited, respectively.
The latter group, on average, has lower level of retirement wealth, and almost all the wealthiest
households inherit large amounts of wealth from the previous generations.
Figure 5.9 displays Gini coe¢ cients for wealth for each decile. The subsample of households
that never inherited has similar wealth inequality for the lowest 7 deciles but has lower wealth
inequality for the highest 3 deciles than for the whole sample. This indicates that bequests
do not play a major role at generating wealth heterogeneity for the lower and middle income
deciles but they are crucial in explaining wealth heterogeneity for the higher income deciles.
Figures 5.10 a-c show the retirement wealth distributions for the 2nd, 5th and 9th lifetime
earning deciles. The distribution of retirement wealth among the subsample of households who
never inherit is similar to that in the whole sample. In the model, those who never inherit
hold less wealth that the whole sample, and the di⁄erence increases as wealth decile increases.
Again this comparison indicates that inheritance heterogeneity plays a more important role for
the higher income deciles.
Table 5.5 provide further evidence along these lines. We ￿nd that, in the subsample, the
correlation between retirement wealth and lifetime earnings (0.86) is stronger than in the whole
sample(0.40)8. The average Gini coe¢ cient of retirement wealth within lifetime earning deciles
is 0.42, compared with 0.46 among all households.
8The correlation of retirement wealth and lifetime earnings among households never inherited in the model
is higher than this observed in the data (0.51). However, the low correlation of retirement wealth and lifetime
earnings in the data among households in the PSID inherited less than $1000 should be interpreted with care
since PSID households tend to underreport inheritances (Hendricks (2004)).
195.2.2 Intuition
A simple life-cycle model without earning uncertainty and without borrowing constraints pre-
dicts a perfect correlation between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth. Adding earning
uncertainty and borrowing constraints breaks the prefect correlation since the timing of positive
or negative shocks di⁄er among household with identical lifetime earnings.
Consider two households with the same lifetime earning but one has positive earning shocks
when young and negative earning shocks when old, the other has the reverse.
A household with positive earning shocks when young would save more in the earlier age to
bu⁄er against negative earning shocks later. When he/she su⁄ers from negative earning shocks,
he/she uses assets to ￿nance consumption, resulting in low level of retirement wealth.
A household with negative earning shocks when young anticipates high income in the future
and would like to borrow to ￿nance consumption but cannot. When he/she gets positive earning
shocks, he/she saves most of them for retirement, and ends up holding a relatively large amount
of wealth at retirement.
For example, a household may have the following realizations of sequences of income shocks
3 2 3 4 4 3 2 2 1 ,
where the numbers indicate the corresponding grid points in the Markov process. He/she
has the same discounted lifetime income of $146;100 (in 1992 dollars) with another household
with the following realizations of sequences of income shocks
2 1 1 1 2 3 3 6 6 .
Their parents have income level of 2 at age of 50 so their expectations of bequests are
the same. Neither of them received any bequests. But because of the timing of income, the
second household has retirement assets of $588;600, 62 times bigger than the ￿rst household
has ($9;500).
206 Decomposition
To understand the quantitative importance of intergenerational links, I run several experiments.
First, to see how much wealth inequality can be generated by the life-cycle structure when only
earnings uncertainty is activated, I turn o⁄ all intergenerational links and assume accidental
bequests are equally redistributed among 50-year-old people. I recalibrate ￿ and ￿l accordingly.
Next I activate the intergenerational transfer of productivity. Finally I look at a model where
parents care about bequests but there is no intergenerational transfer of productivity.
6.1 No Intergenerational Links
6.1.1 Wealth Distribution
Table 6.1 compares the benchmark economy with one without intergenerational links. This
con￿rms ￿ndings in De Nardi (2004), that a model without intergenerational links cannot
generate a skewed wealth distribution comparable with the data. The Gini coe¢ cient of wealth
is only 0:64, compared with 0:72 in the benchmark economy and 0:78 in the data. The fraction
of wealth held by the richest 1% is only 7% in the model, compared with 21% in the benchmark
model and 29% in the data.
6.1.2 Wealth Inequality and Lifetime Earnings
Table 6.2, row three, shows statistics summarizing the relationship between retirement wealth
and lifetime earnings in the model without intergenerational links. The correlation between
retirement wealth and lifetime earnings is stronger than in the benchmark economy, and once we
control for age and lifetime earnings, there is much less wealth inequality than in the data. The
average Gini coe¢ cient of retirement wealth within lifetime earning deciles is 0:37, compared
with 0:46 in the benchmark.
Figure 6.1a and 6.1b show the relationship between retirement wealth and lifetime earn-
ings in the model without intergenerational links. The correlation of retirement wealth and
lifetime earnings in the model is much stronger than in the benchmark economy (see Figure
5.7 and 5.3 respectively). Compared with the benchmark economy, households in this economy
21have, on average, much less retirement wealth. This comparison shows that a model without
intergenerational links has trouble generating large wealth holdings.
Figure 6.2 compares the Gini coe¢ cients of wealth and Figure 6.3 shows the ratio of median
retirement wealth to mean lifetime earnings, for each lifetime income decile. The model without
intergenerational links generates a realistic amount of wealth inequality and a realistic ratio of
retirement wealth to earnings for the lower and median deciles but not for the higher deciles.
This con￿rms that the heterogeneity of inheritance plays a role only for the higher income
deciles.
Figures 6.4 a-c show the retirement wealth distributions for the 2nd, 5th and 9th lifetime
earning deciles. The model generates skewed wealth distribution comparable to the data for
the 2nd and 5th lifetime earning deciles. Households in the 9th lifetime earning decile in this
model hold less wealth than in the benchmark economy. Households with higher lifetime income
will still save more than households with lower lifetime income since pension is independent of
lifetime income. But without an operative bequest motive, the saving for retirement motive
alone is not strong enough for income-rich households (for example, households in the 9th
income decile) to generate a high saving rate and a high retirement wealth comparable to the
data.
6.2 No Bequest Motives
I now look at the model where parents do not care about leaving bequests to their children
but there is intergenerational transfer of productivity. Accidental bequests are inherited by
the children of the deceased. Table 6.2, row four, reports the relevant statistics. In this case,
the correlation between retirement wealth and lifetime earnings is close to the case without
intergenerational links. The average Gini coe¢ cient of retirement wealth within lifetime earning
deciles is 0:37, compared with 0:46 in the benchmark.
This comparison shows that the unequal distribution of involuntary bequests and intergen-
erational transfer of human capital are not su¢ cient to generate the observed heterogeneity of
retirement wealth. One reason is that accidental bequests are not enough to generate skewed
inheritance distribution. Table 6.3, row three, shows the Lorenz curve of inheritance distribu-
22tion. Without voluntary bequest motive, more than 80% of the households do not inherit any
bequests, compared with 70% in the benchmark model. The top 2% of the households receive
37% of the total inheritance, compared with 70% in the benchmark economy. The other reason
is that, without an operative bequest motive, those who have inherited large estates from their
parents will consume a large part of their inheritances by the age of 65.
Figure 6.5 displays the Gini coe¢ cient for each income decile. Compared with the whole
sample, the subsample of households that never inherited has only slightly smaller wealth
inequality for all income deciles. Thus the additional heterogeneity of retirement wealth result-
ing from the endogenous heterogeneity of inheritance, is small compared with the benchmark
model.
In summary, the comparison of models with and without bequest motives shows that the
unequal distribution of involuntary bequest and intergenerational transfers of human capital
are not quantitatively important.
6.3 No Productivity Transfers
I now look at the model where parents care about leaving bequests to their children but there
is no intergenerational transfer of productivity (Table 6.2 row ￿ve). In this case the correlation
between retirement wealth and lifetime earnings is 0.78, compared with 0.40 in the benchmark
economy and 0.89 in the model without intergenerational links. The average Gini coe¢ cient of
retirement wealth within lifetime earning deciles is 0:45, compared with 0:46 in the benchmark,
and 0:37 in the model without intergenerational links.
Table 6.3, row four, shows the Lorenz curve of inheritance distribution. The top 2% of
the households receive 34% of the total inheritance, compared with 70% in the benchmark
economy, and 37% in a model without bequest motive. However, with an operative bequest
motive, those who inherited large estates from their parents will consume only a small part of
their inheritances by the age of 65. Thus the heterogeneity of inheritance adds a lot to the
heterogeneity of retirement wealth.
Figure 6.6 shows the Gini coe¢ cient for each income decile. Compared with the whole
sample, the subsample of households that never inherited has a much smaller wealth inequality
23for all income deciles. This di⁄ers from the benchmark with productivity transfer (Figure 5.9)
where inheritance heterogeneity only adds wealth inequality for the highest 3 deciles. In a
model without intergenerational transfer of productivity, low productivity households can also
inherit large fortune from their parents, resulting in large heterogeneity of retirement wealth
among low income groups.
In summary, the comparison of models with and without a productivity link shows that
the intergenerational transfers of human capital is crucial in generating the heterogeneity of
retirement wealth for high income deciles.
7 Conclusions
Empirical studies using micro data ￿nd that there is a large heterogeneity in retirement wealth
among households with similar lifetime earnings, and raise doubts about the ability of a stan-
dard life-cycle model of saving behavior to reproduce the observed facts.
I use a quantitative, incomplete-markets, life-cycle, general equilibrium model in which par-
ents and their children are linked by voluntary bequests and by the transmission of earnings
ability. I show that the two intergenerational links I consider generate an amount of heterogene-
ity in retirement wealth comparable to that in the data. This suggests that a properly speci￿ed
life-cycle model with intergenerational transfers of human capital and bequests captures the
fundamental determinants of households saving and wealth accumulation.
I also investigate the quantitative relevance of income heterogeneity, borrowing constraints,
and intergenerational links, respectively, in causing heterogeneity in retirement wealth. I ￿nd
that, while income heterogeneity and borrowing constraints are essential to generate the hetero-
geneity in retirement wealth among low lifetime income households, the existence of intergen-
erational links is crucial to explain the heterogeneity in retirement wealth among high lifetime
income households.
Finally, I discuss the likely quantitative implications of some of my simplifying assumptions.
One important assumption is that there are no inter-vivos transfers, while in the data, parents
give money to children when they need it the most (i.e. when they are young). Data from the
24HRS suggests that these transfers are fairly small (see Cardia and Ng (2000)). Given the small
size of observed inter-vivos monetary transfers, I doubt that this inclusion would much a⁄ect
the quantitative predictions of our model.
I make the restrictive assumption that children only observe parents productivity at certain
ages. This assumption is for computational reasons. For example, allowing children to observe
parents productivity at two periods adds one more state variable and also increases substantially
the time needed to iterate over the bequest distributions. Moreover, income in the calibration is
very persistent, so an observation of one year of income is likely to be not much less informative
than two. In a model in which the parent￿ s assets and income are observable by the children, the
saving behavior of households aged before 40 is likely to be similar as in this model, due to the
uncertainty of inheritance time. For households aged 45 whose parents die for sure next period,
those with poor parents will save more and those with rich parents will save less in the current
period, making the e⁄ect of inheritance heterogeneity on retirement wealth variation smaller
than in this model. Since inheritance heterogeneity only a⁄ects retirement wealth variation for
the high income deciles, the Gini coe¢ cient of the highest three income deciles may be lower
than in this model.
This paper assumes ex-ante identical households and lets ex-post income shocks account
for the observed heterogeneity in lifetime earnings. In the data, we also observe a very large
inequality in wealth holdings by race (see for example Smith (1995) and Altonji and Doraszelski
(2002)) and by education (Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995), Cagetti(2003)). It would be
interesting to extend this model to allow for ex-ante heterogeneity in the earnings process, to
study wealth inequality among di⁄erent social groups.
This paper abstracts from entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship is an important source of
wealth inequality (Quadrini (2000); Cagetti and De Nardi (2003)). Since, with incomplete
markets, self-employment gives households an additional incentive to save, entrepreneurs and
workers have di⁄erent saving behaviors even with similar lifetime income. Adding entrepreneur-
ship in an otherwise standard model could help to generate more heterogeneity of retirement
wealth. This is left for future research.
This paper also abstracts from housing. Housing is the single largest investment made by
25consumers over their life time. The median household owns a house valued about twice its
annual income. As it is shown in Yang (2005), abstracting from housing may bias the study
of life-cycle consumption and assets accumulation behavior. It will be interesting to extend
this model to look at the e⁄ect of income heterogeneity and bequest heterogeneity on wealth
heterogeneity in an environment with housing.
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318 Appendix: Computation of the Model
I discretize both the productivity and the productivity inheritance processes to six-state Markov
chains according to Tauchen and Hussey (1991). Since I want the possible realizations for the
initial inherited productivity level to be the same as the possible realizations for productivity
during the lifetime, I choose the quadrature points jointly for the two processes. The resulting
grid points for the productivity process y are [ 0.2114 0.4135 0.7495 1.3342 2.4187 4.7309]. The










0:5529 0:3619 0:0789 0:0062 0:0002 0:0000
0:1877 0:4398 0:2970 0:0702 0:0053 0:0001
0:0315 0:2286 0:4208 0:2627 0:0540 0:0025
0:0025 0:0540 0:2627 0:4208 0:2286 0:0315
0:0001 0:0053 0:0702 0:2970 0:4398 0:1877





















0:3341 0:5791 0:0853 0:0015 0:0000 0:0000
0:0368 0:4857 0:4336 0:0435 0:0004 0:0000
0:0016 0:1315 0:5798 0:2738 0:0132 0:0000
0:0000 0:0132 0:2738 0:5798 0:1315 0:0016
0:0000 0:0004 0:0435 0:4336 0:4857 0:0368











The state space for asset holdings is discretized. Choices are not restricted to be in the
grid. For choices between grid points, linear interpolation is used. Using this grid I can store
the value functions and the distribution of households as ￿nite-dimensional arrays.
I solve the approximated optimal consumption and saving plans recursively. Households
surviving to the last period T has an easy problem to solve. Based on the period T pol-
icy functions, I solve the consumption and saving decisions that maximize the period T ￿ 1
value function. The same procedure is carried back until decision rules in the ￿rst period are
computed for a large number of states.
32I solve for the steady state equilibrium as follows:
1. Given an initial guess of ￿l:
2. Given an initial guess of interest rate r, use the equilibrium conditions in the factor
markets to obtain the wage rate w.
3. Set the interval for assets.
4. Guess an initial bequest distribution.
5. Solve the value function for the last period of life for each of the points of the grid.
6. By backward induction, repeat the steps 5 until the ￿rst period in life.
7. Compute the associated stationary distribution of households.
8. Given the stationary distribution and policy functions, compute the bequest distribution.
If the bequest distributions converges, go to step 9; otherwise go to step 4.
9. Check if the distributions of assets do not have a large mass at the maximum levels. If
so, increase the maximum level and go back to step 3. If not, continue to step 10.
10. Check if all markets clear. If not, go to step 2 and update interest rate r.
11, If the government budget is balanced, an equilibrium is found. If not, go to step 1 and
update ￿l:
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  C_WE C_LWE  Mean Gini  R_90/20  N 
Baseline  sample  0.48  0.51  0.60 1.78 1466 
Never  self-employed  0.22  0.47  0.53 2.05 910 
Never  divorced  0.49  0.52  0.60 1.81 1293 
One/two  children  0.30  0.52  0.54 2.00 376 
No stock holdings  0.16  0.40  0.63  0.98  1055 
No  inheritance  0.52  0.53  0.60 1.91 1164 
Note: from Hendricks (2004) 
C_WE: correlation coefficient between lifetime earnings and retirement wealth. 
C_LWE: correlation coefficient between log lifetime earnings and log retirement wealth. 
Mean Gini: average Gini coefficient of retirement wealth within lifetime earnings deciles. 
R_90/20: ratio of retirement wealth relative to lifetime earnings for the 9th v.s. the 2nd lifetime earnings 
decile. 




n  population  growth 





t ε  age-efficiency  profile 
y ρ   AR(1) coefficient of income process 
2
y σ   innovation of income process 
yh ρ   AR(1) coefficient of income inheritance process 
2








α   capital share in National Income 





l τ   tax on labor income    
a τ   tax on capital income    
b τ   tax on bequest 
b ex   exemption level on bequest tax 
p   pension replacement rate 









η   risk aversion coefficient 
β  discount  factor 
1 φ   weight of bequest in utility function 






Table 4.1: Parameters used in the benchmark model   35
 
 
  Top  1% 95-99% 80-95% 60-80% 40-60% 20-40% Wealth<=
0 (%) 
Gini 
SCF  29 24 27 13 5  2  5.8-15  0.78 
Benchmark  21.0677    18.1521    34.3613    18.0457    6.4862     1.7793  0.1035      0.7203 
       Note: Data from De Nardi (2004) 
Table 5.1:  Percentage wealth held in the wealth distribution 
    
 
 
Percentage  Class  70  80 90 95  98  100
SCF  0.0  1.8 9.4 18.9  30.8  100
Model  0   0.0142      6.1316       16.8912     29.5078     100
      Note: Data from Hendricks (2004) 




Percentage  Class  70 80 90 95 98 100 
PSID  0.0 0.2 1.3 3.2 10.7  105 
Model  0      0.4538        2.8577       4.7301       7.5903    228.5867 
      Note: Data from Hendricks (2001) 





 C_WE  C_LWE  Mean  Gini  Gini  R_90/20 
PSID  0.48 0.51 0.60  0.70  1.78-  3.0 
Benchmark model  0.4124      0.7900      0.4604      0.6388  7.4455 
       
Hendrick(2004)         
Determ.  Aging  0.93 0.79 0.46    587.93 
No bequest  0.91 0.66 0.47    18.02 
Accid.  Bequest  0.91 0.68 0.45    15.18 
Joy-of-giving  0.91 0.82 0.39    6.72 
Strong  altruism  0.90 0.68 0.49    19.25 
Table 5.4:  Relationship between retirement wealth and lifetime earnings 
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 C_WE  C_LWE  Mean  Gini  Gini  R_90/20 
PSID 0.48  0.51  0.60  0.70  1.78-  3.0 
Benchmark model  0.4124     0.7900      0.4604      0.6388  7.4455 
Benchmark (Never inherited)  0.8633    0.4201     





  Top  1% 95-99% 80-95% 60-80% 40-60% 20-40% Wealth
≤0 (%) 
Gini 
SCF  29 24 27 13 5  2  5.8-15  0.78 
Benchmark  21.0677    18.1521    34.3613    18.0457    6.4862     1.7793  0.1035     0.7203 
No Links  6.9522      22.0284  40.5612  21.3308    7.3857    1.7188     17.23     0.6380 





 C_WE  C_LWE  Mean  Gini  Gini  R_90/20 
PSID  0.48 0.51 0.60 0.70 1.78-  3.0 
Benchmark  0.4124      0.7900      0.4604      0.6388  7.4455 
No Links  0.8930      0.8167      0.3724      0.5303      6.4409 
No bequest motive  0.8891        0.8061      0.3707    0.5299      4.8232 
No productivity transfer   0.7712      0.7096      0.4513      0.5466      4.1517 





Percentage  Class  70  80 90 95  98  100
SCF  0.0  1.8 9.4 18.9  30.8  100
Benchmark  0.0   0.0142      6.1316       16.8912     29.5078     100
No bequest motive  0.0  0.0  11.1379     35.0218     62.7047  100
No productivity transfer  0.0  0.6092     16.9926     40.0585     65.6264  100
Table 6.3:  Lorenz curve of inheritance distribution 
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Figure 2.1: Retirement wealth and lifetime earning in PSID 
 
  
Figure 2.2: Gini coefficient of retirement wealth for each income decile 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Median of retirement wealth for each income decile 
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Figure 3.1: Demographics 
















Figure 5.4: Gini coefficient for each income decile 
 




Figure 5.5:  Retirement wealth and lifetime earnings 
 
 

















Figure 5.7: Retirement wealth and lifetime earning in the benchmark 
model 
 
Figure 5.8: Retirement wealth and lifetime earning in the benchmark 
model (households never inherited) 
 
 




Figure 5.10 a: Distribution of wealth (households never inherited), 2
nd  
Decile   41
 











Figure 6.1 a: Retirement wealth and lifetime earning in the model (no 
links) 
 
Figure 6.1 b: Retirement wealth and lifetime earning in the model (no 
links) 
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Figure 6.3:  retirement wealth and lifetime earnings 
 
 




Figure 6.4 b: Distribution of wealth, 5
th decile 
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Figure 6.6: Gini coefficient for each income decile (no productivity 
transfer) 
 
 
 